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Abstract:  This  article  discusses  bondholder  exchange  offers,  a  useful  private  debt-
restructuring technique. In a typical offer, an under-performing issuer will seek to exchange 
its old bonds for new bonds with economically less favourable terms to bondholders, thus 
deleveraging the issuer without the difficulties of a formal insolvency process. Some issuers 
seek to incentivise their bondholders to accept these new, less favourable bonds by using 
coercive tactics, such as ‘exit consents’ and ‘covenant strips’. While lawful in the US, the 
English courts have only recently considered them for the first time in relation to English 
Law bonds. The Assénagon case declared an egregious coercive tactic invalid on the basis of 
an old company law principle, casting doubt on the validity of other coercive tactics. This 
principle (the’abuse principle’) originally restricted the abuse of minority shareholders by the 
majority,  but  is  now  also  applicable  to  debt  security  voting  arrangements.  This  article 
examines the abuse principle through the cases and discusses its potential application to other 
forms of coercive tactics in exchange offers. The article argues that where a coercive tactic is 
used purely to compel bondholders to exchange their bonds, this will contravene the abuse 
principle. The use of coercive tactics may however still be consistent with the abuse principle 
and Assénagon. An issuer will need to show that ‘reasonable men’ could see the tactic as 
beneficial  for  the  class  of  bondholders,  even  though  its  use  might  adversely  affect 
non-exchanging  bondholders.  A  potential  permissible  example  is  a  covenant  strip  that 
removes  a  restriction  on  asset  disposals  in  order  to  facilitate  a  disposal  pursuant  to  a 
restructuring. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The legal regimes of the United States and the United Kingdom cater for both statutory and 
consensual  restructurings  of  financially  distressed  companies.1 If a company in financial 
distress is worth saving, then ‘most well-informed practitioners think that a work-out is by far 
the best if it can be achieved’.2 A private work-out permits the company to avoid the ‘trauma 
and taint of insolvency’, retain control of the process and thus maintain value and avoid the 
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1 The relevant procedure in the US is Chapter 11 of the United St ates Bankruptcy Code. In the UK, rescue 
procedures may be undertaken through a ‘panoply’ of procedures, including through a scheme of arrangement in 
terms of the Companies Act 2006, ss 895–899, or a company voluntary arrangement in terms of the Insolvency 
Act 1986, ss 1-7: Chris Howard and Bob Hedger, Restructuring Law and Practice (LexisNexis 2008) 2, 4. 
2 Philip R  Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 33. Whether a 
work-out is actually preferable depends, however, on the health of the company; if the company is utterly 
beyond redemption then a formal insolvency proceeding would be preferable to attempting a work-out: Howard 
and Hedger (n 1) 5. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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transaction costs associated with a court procedure.3 A private work-out can also be faster, 
which is significant in the distressed context.4 
Despite  these  substantial  advantages,  cred itors  of  large  insolvent  firms  achieve 
settlements  in  fewer than  half of US  cases;  other  private lawsuits  by  contrast  have  a 
settlement rate of over 90%. 5 A significant obstacle to achieving a consensual bondholder 
restructuring in the US is section 316 of the US Trust Indenture Act of 1939, which requires 
unanimous consent for the amendment of terms affecting the rights of bondholders to receive 
payments of interest and principal.6 However, during the ‘deleveraging of corporate America’ 
in the 1980s, issuers explored other means of retiring tranches of their debt, notably the use of 
exchange and tender offers.7 An exchange offer generally entails the issuer offering holders 
of existing debt securities to tender those for an exchange of new securities, which  might be 
securities with a lower interest rate or face value, or equity securities. A tender offer, by 
contrast, is an exchange of existing securities for cash.8 
Section  316  of  the  Trust  Indenture  Act  entails,  however,  that  non -exchanging 
bondholders cannot be denied payments of interest or principal without their consent. These 
‘hold-out  creditors’  are  a  threat  to  a  successful  restructuring,  because  their  refusal  to 
exchange threatens to  consume the savings  created by the exchange offer.9 As such, US 
issuers have in the past introduced a variety of coercive tactics into their exchange offers in 
an attempt to make the alternative to the exchange offer  – not exchanging – relatively less 
attractive. US courts have upheld the use of two of such tactics, namely exit consents and 
consent solicitation payments.10 Typically, an exit consent requires exchanging bondholders 
to consent to the removal of protective covenants in the indenture as a condition of the 
                                                 
3 Wood (n 2) 33. 
4 Suniati Yap, ‘Investing in Chapter 11 Companies: Vultures or White Knights?’ (1995) 2 J L & Trade Am 153, 
162. 
5 Alan Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts’ (1993) 36 J L & Econ 595. 
6 As such, there have been calls for its repeal: Mark J Roe,  ‘The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts’ (1987) 
97 Yale L J 232, 235. 
7 Andrew Bab, ‘Debt Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem of Coercion’ (1991) 91 Columbia L Rev 846. 
8 Bab (n 7) 848-9. The distinction between exchange and tender offers is not significant in the present context 
and I will use the terms interchangeably. The offer will be at a discount to face value, but typically at a premium 
to trading value, in order to incentivise bondholders to participate in the exchange. 
9 One of the common responses to the threat of transferring subsidies to hold -outs is to make the offer 
conditional on a high acceptance threshold, such as 85% to 95%: Roe (n 6) 236; John C Coffee, Jnr and William 
A  Klein,  ‘Bondholder  Coercion:  The  Problem  of  Constrained  Choice  in  Debt  Tender  Offers  and 
Recapitalizations’ (1991) 58 U of Chicago LR 1207. For a recent UK example of an exchange offer that had a 
minimum  acceptance  rate  of  75%,  see  The  Co-operative  Bank  Plc,  Prospectus,  dated  4  November  2013 
<http://www.co-
operativebank.co.uk/assets/pdf/bank/investorrelations/debtinvestors/lt2standalone2013/prospectus.pdf> 
accessed 1 February 2015. 
10 Respectively, Katz v Oak Industries Inc 508 A2d 873 (Del Ch 1986) and Kass v Eastern Airlines Inc [1986] 
WL 13008 (Del Ch). Assessing the Legality of Coercive Restructuring Tactics in UK Exchange Offers 
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exchange. Consent solicitation payments are payments that the issuer makes to bondholders 
who agree to vote in favour of an amendment effected to the indenture. The coercive effect of 
the tactics is in part premised on the ability to place bondholders into a prisoner’s dilemma, 
where their dominant strategy is to opt for an outcome that, in their unconstrained choice, 
they would reject.11 
Both tactics have a history of use in England. 12 However, until the decisions of 
Assénagon  Asset  Management  SA  v  Irish  Bank  Corpn  Ltd 13  and  Azevedo  v  Imcopa 
Importação,  Exportação  e  Indústria  de  Olėos  Ltda14 in  2012,  the  courts  had  not  had  an 
opportunity to consider their validity. The Assénagon case concerned a very unusual exit 
consent that expropriated the non-exchanging bondholders’ bonds for nominal consideration. 
The court found that the resolution was invalid on the basis of an old company law principle 
that originally provided that shareholders must exercise their power to amend the articles of 
association of the company ‘bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole’ (the ‘abuse 
principle’).15 On the other hand, the Azevedo case permitted consent solicitation payments. 
In Part B of this article, I will discuss the use in practice of coercive restructuring 
tactics, such as exit consents in exchange offers. Since such tactics have a longer tradition of 
use in the US and because the US bond market dwarfs that of the UK, the analysis will 
concentrate on that market.16 I will argue that a variety of tactics other than exit consents 
have a potentially coercive effect. I will then  examine whether there are good grounds to 
consider them as coercive as some commentators have argued and whether the prisoner’s 
dilemma  model  of  bondholder  co-ordination  is  accurate.  In  Part  C,  I  will  discuss  the 
application  of  the  abuse  principle,  currently  the  most  powerful  defence  against  coercive 
restructuring tactics in English law, through the English cases and draw out the relevant legal 
propositions. In Part D, I will consider the application of the abuse principle in the Redwood 
and Assénagon cases, as well its potential application to the Azevedo case.17 
                                                 
11 Coffee and Klein (n 9) 1231. 
12 James Cole, ‘How to apply US-style exchange offers in Europe’ (2002) 21 Int’l Fin L Rev 52. 
13 [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch). 
14 [2012] EWHC 1849 (Comm); [affd] [2013] EWCA Civ 364. 
15 Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656, 671. 
16 In 2011, US firms issued US $1trillion worth of corporate debt; by comparison, the UK had issuance of only 
£38bn: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association , ‘US Bond Market Issuance and Outstanding’ 
<www.sifma.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589942781> accessed 1 February 2015; Aashish Pattani, 
Giuseppe Vera and James Wackett, ‘Going Public: UK Companies’ Use of Capital Markets’ (2011) 4 Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin 319, 320, 325. 
17 Redwood Master Fund Ltd v TD Bank Europe Ltd [2002] EWHC 2073 (Ch); Assénagon (n 13); Azevedo (n 
14). UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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A paradox that I seek to answer in this article is the difference in verdicts in the 
Assénagon and Azevedo cases.18 Commentators have noted that ‘it is not intuitively obvious 
why one of these techniques should be lawful and the other not’.19 I aim to explain this 
apparent anomaly on the basis of the abuse principle. An important consideration is how the 
abuse principle interacts with coercive restructuring techniques. On this point, I will argue 
that the prisoner’s dilemma model of bondholder co-ordination does not always accurately 
reflect marketplace interactions. This provides reason to regard the alleged coercive effect of 
these  restructuring  tactics  with  a  measure  of  scepticism.  It  also  suggests  that  the  abuse 
principle’s relatively deferential assessment is appropriate. The thesis of this article is that the 
invalidation  of  the  expropriatory  exit  consent  in  Assénagon  does  not  entail  that  all 
restructuring tactics that impose adverse consequences on a minority are necessarily invalid: 
it is consistent with the abuse principle to impose prejudicial consequences on a minority, 
unless  ‘no  reasonable  men’  could  consider  it  beneficial  for  the  class.20 If  one  views  the 
decisions in Azevedo and Assénagon in this light, the two can be successfully distinguished. 
The distinction lies in the fact that the Assénagon exit consent could not rationally be said to 
benefit the class, whereas the Azevedo case could (or, at least, its putative benefit was not 
demonstrably irrational). 
 
B.  EXCHANGE OFFERS: A US LAW PERSPECTIVE 
In the US, section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 provides that issuers require the 
unanimous  consent  of  bondholders  to  amend  ‘the  right  of  any  holder  of  any  indenture 
security  to  receive  payment  of  the  principal  of  and  interest  on  such  indenture’. 21 The 
difficulties of obtaining unanimous consent mean that bond exchange and tender offers are an 
important mechanism for US firms to quickly ‘relieve long-term financial pressure and avoid 
short-term liquidity squeezes’, without the expense – regarding both time and money – of 
going into bankruptcy.22 
 
 
                                                 
18 Assénagon (n 13); Azevedo (n 14). 
19 Stephen Moverly Smith and Harry Sharpe, ‘An Offer You Can’t Refuse: When Does Coercion of a Group to 
Accept a Proposal Constitute Oppression of the Minority’ (2014) JIBFL 288, 289. 
20 Shuttleworth v Cox Bros and Co (Maidenhead) [1927] 2 KB 9, 18. 
21 This is subject to a carve-out that the indenture may provide that the holders of 75% of outstanding securities 
may consent to a postponement of interest for a period of not more than three years: s 316(a)(2). 
22 Lewis S Peterson,  ‘Who’s  Being  Greedy?  A  Theoretical  and  Empirical  Examination  of  Holdouts  and 
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1.  Hold-out creditors and other obstacles to successful exchange offers 
The primary disadvantage of a work-out such as an exchange offer is the need for ‘unanimity 
or  near  unanimity  amongst  the  participating  creditors  –  the  problem  of  the  ‘hold-out 
creditor’’.23 In the context of a bondholder exchange offer, hold-out creditors are bondholders 
who do not exchange their bonds. If the exchange is completed, the issuer’s financial health 
improves,  making  it  better  able  to  pay  the  non-exchanging  bondholders  in  full.24 Thus, 
provided the restructuring is successful, the non -exchanging hold-outs are ‘enriched at the 
expense’ of those who do exchange.25 The hope of a payout of 100% of the face value of a 
bond,  particularly  where  the  bond  may  have  been  acquired  in  a  distressed  scenario  at  a 
fraction of that price, potentially provides a powerful motivation for creditors to hold out. 
In a completed exchange offer with an excessive amount of hold-outs, the exchanging 
bondholders will in effect be subsidising the gains of the hold-outs and making their debt 
more valuable (ie ‘buoying up the debt’).26 If the subsidy to the non-exchanging bondholders 
is greater than the costs saved by avoiding a court reorganisation procedure or bankruptcy, 
then the bondholders should refuse the exchange.27 Even if the subsidy to the hold-outs is less 
than the cost of bankruptcy, bondholders may baulk at the idea of violating the principle o f 
‘equality  of  sacrifice’,  which  advisers  stress  should  govern  a  restructuring. 28 The  risk, 
therefore, of holding out is that other bondholders will also vote strategically and hold out, 
thus  preventing  a  consensual  work-out  and  forcing  the  issuer  into  a  formal  court-based 
proceeding or insolvency, with the attendant, Pareto-inefficient, risks and costs (including the 
risk that the bondholders would receive less in an insolvency proceeding than in the exchange 
offer).29 
In addition to the problem of the hold -out creditor, there are a number of other 
obstacles to completing successful exchange offers. One important issue for bondholders is 
the difficulty of ascertaining whether the exchange offer is fair. The US distressed debt 
trading markets are arguably less efficient than the equity trading markets, because there is 
less  information  available  regarding  distressed  securities  and  the  trading  is  relatively 
illiquid.30 In particular, securities analysts do not devote the same level of research to the 
                                                 
23 Wood (n 2) 34. 
24 Roe (n 6) 236; Bab (n 7) 849. 
25 Roe (n 6) 236. 
26 ibid 234. 
27 ibid 236. 
28 ibid 237. 
29 Bab (n 7) 849; Schwartz (n 5) 595. 
30 Coffee and Klein (n 9) 1217. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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distressed debt market, because of the reduced appetite for information about the market.31 In 
Europe, this inefficiency is exacerbated by ‘a lack of experienced players as well as different 
legal regimes across European Union countries’, while in the UK, there is simply ‘no proper 
market for distressed debt’.32 These factors suggest that it will be difficult to objectively 
verify that an exchange offer is fair. Creditors may also be wary about trusting the issuer, 
based  on  previous  defaults  or  bad  dealings.33 This might  be  exacerbated  by  a  ‘perverse 
incentive’ of issuers contemplating an exchange offer ‘to withhold positive information from 
the market,  in  order to  increase the discount  by  which the bonds  trade below their  face 
amount’.34 The lack of a means to objectively verify information, as well as the information 
asymmetry between the issuer and its bondholders, tend to lessen the chance of a successful 
consensual work-out.35 Lastly, Kahneman and Tversky’s work on prospect theory suggests a 
further  aggravating  factor.  Their  studies  have  shown  that  the  loss  aversion  exhibited  by 
decision-makers  bargaining  under  risk  translates  into  risk-seeking  behaviour  when 
confronting losses.36 Bondholders are thus more likely to reject ‘fair’ settlements that impose 
certain losses on them in favour of riskier strategies that might result in no losses, or gains, 
but which ultimately have a lower expected value and are sub-optimal. Their studies therefore 
suggest that work-out negotiations, where bondholders are bargaining over uncertain losses, 
will be amongst the most difficult to obtain consensus. 
2.  Coercive restructuring techniques 
The obstacles to a successful exchange offer alluded to above suggest that if an issuer is able 
to alter the incentives of its bondholders in assessing the exchange offer, thus making the 
exchange offer more likely to succeed, then it should. Issuers do in fact have a variety of 
tactics  at  their  disposal  to  achieve  this  end.  Three  tactics  are  of  particular  relevance  for 
present purposes: the exit consent, the consent solicitation payment and the early consent 
                                                 
31 Coffee and Klein (n 9) 1219. 
32  Anousha  Sakoui,  ‘Big  returns  lure  investors  to  distressed  debt’  (Financial  Times,  6  July  2010) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e703da28-892a-11df-8ecd-00144feab49a.html#axzz39Wtkanae>  accessed  26 
January 2015; John Board and others, ‘The Impact of the Credit Crunch on the Sterling Corporate Bond Market’ 
(2009) Investment Management Association 29. 
33 Yap (n 4) 158. 
34 Coffee and Klein (n 9) 1220. Of course, were such actions undertaken in the UK they could potentially attract 
liability under other areas of law, such as the market abuse regime in terms of the Financial Service s and 
Markets Act 2000, but this is beyond the scope of this article. 
35 Roe (n 6) 238. 
36 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’ (1986) 59 Journal of 
Business 251. In another study, the authors conducted an experiment where respondents were asked to choose 
between a sure loss of $750 or a 75% chance to lose $1000. The equivalence in expected value implied that a 
rational actor would be neutral as to which choice it took, but 87% of the respondents preferred the gamble (ie 
they exhibited an irrational preference for risk-seeking behaviour when confronting potential losses): Kahneman 
and Tversky, ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’ (1981) 211 Science 453, 454. Assessing the Legality of Coercive Restructuring Tactics in UK Exchange Offers 
168 
deadline.37 When a US-style exit consent accompanies an exchange offer, an exchanging 
bondholder is only permitted to tender its old bonds for exchange if at the same time it 
consents to the removal of prote ctive covenants in the old bonds via the exit consent. The 
coercive  force  of  the  exit  consent  arises  out  of  the  individual  bondholder’s  concern  that 
without the protective covenants and with the drop in liquidity in the bonds post-exchange, its 
old  bonds  ‘will  be  worth  substantially  less  than  even  its  low  market  price  prior  to  the 
exchange’.38 It is often said that a central aspect of the coercive effect is the dispersion and 
anonymity of bondholders, which prevents them from co-ordinating with each other and thus 
overcoming the prisoner’s dilemma scenario that is imposed on them.39 For some US issuers, 
a key purpose of the exit consent is to reduce the attractiveness of the old bonds, compared to 
the new bonds, and encourage their exchange where the bondholders might otherwise have 
refused.40 However, there may also be arguably valid commercial reasons for an exit consent, 
such as the removal of a negative pledge in order to grant new security pursuant to the wider 
restructuring plan.41 
A similarly coercive technique is for the issuer to include a consent payment with a 
consent  solicitation  requesting  the  amendment  or  waiver  of  bondholder  rights  in  the 
indenture.42 If a bondholder votes in favour of the proposed amendment and the amendment 
is successfully instituted, the bondholder receives the consent payment. If the bondholder 
does not vote in favour of the restructuring, it receives the ‘punishment’ of foregoing the 
consent payment.43 This punishment is a form of coercion. 
Lastly,  there  is  the  ‘early  consent  deadline’. 44 Rule  14e-1  of  the  US  Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 requires all US tender offers to remain open for at least 20 business 
days, but issuers commonly set early consent deadlines, which provide that bondholders who 
tender their bonds prior to that date receive a greater total consideration than those that do 
                                                 
37 Examples of other tactics with coercive effects include: imposing a high hurdle rate of acceptance on the 
transaction, which decreases the liquidity and thus the value of non-exchanged bonds (Bab (n 7) 850; Roe (n 6) 
247,  249),  and  emphasising  the  threat  of  insolvency.  This  latter  approach  was  evident  in  the  Co-operative 
Bank’s exchange offer (n 9) 46. 
38 Peterson (n 22) 513. 
39 Moverly Smith and Sharp (n 19) 288. 
40 Coffee and Klein (n 9) 1212. 
41 Cole (n 12) 52. 
42 Marcel Kahan,  ‘Rethinking  Corporate  Bonds:  The  Trade-Off  between  Individual  and  Collective  Rights’ 
(2002) NYU L Rev 1040, 1058;  Kass (n 10) 1-2, which involved an offering of cash or airline tickets to 
bondholders who voted in favour of removing two restrictive covenants. 
43 Zohar Goshen, ‘Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law’ (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiry in Law 815, 823. 
44 Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and others, Debt Restructuring (Nick Segal and Look Chan Ho eds, OUP 2011) 
92. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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not.45 Inherent in this tactic is a potentially powerful element of coercion. Bondholders might 
be numerous and widely dispersed. An accelerated timeframe compounds the difficulties they 
face in organising themselves so that they may negotiate with the issuer. However, the early 
consent deadline also has a variety of justifiable benefits. Issuers are given ‘an early view of 
the certainty of the outcome, which may aid the completion of other transactions conditioned 
on completion of the exchange offer’.46 Issuers that have an idea of preliminary uptake are 
also empowered to consider whether it will be necessary to extend the offer.47 
3.  The role of the prisoner’s dilemma in coercive tactics 
Bondholder co-ordination (or rather the lack thereof) is a key element in the coercive effect 
of these techniques, which is frequently described as imposing a prisoner’s dilemma situation 
on bondholders.48 Coffee and Klein provide an example of an exchange where a bondho lder 
is invited to exchange and provide an exit consent for a bond that it believes to be worth 
$500, for $450 (currently it cannot find a buyer for $500).49 If the exchange is completed and 
the exit consents denude the old bonds of their protection, they will be worth only $400. The 
decision matrix is as follows: 
Sufficient 
Others’ Choice 
Bondholder’s Choice 
  Don’t Tender  Tender 
Don’t Tender  $500  $500 
Tender  $400  $450 
 
On the author’s version, an exit consent confronts bondholders with a scenario where, 
if they do not tender their bonds, but sufficient others do, they will be left holding a bond 
without protective covenants and diminished liquidity in trading, which will significantly 
erode  its  value.  If  they  do  tender  their  bonds,  but  sufficient  others  do  not,  they  will  be 
unaffected. They do not know whether others will tender their bonds and cannot co-ordinate 
their actions. Whatever sufficient others choose to do, the individual bondholder is better off 
tendering, meaning that this is its dominant strategy. All of the bondholders are faced with 
                                                 
45 US Code of Federal Regulations § 240.14e-1; Olivares-Caminal and others (n 44) 92. A recent UK exchange 
offer made significant use of this technique, albeit modified so that no bondholders would receive the extra 
premium, to the extent that the early deadline was not met: The Co-Operative Bank (n 9) 36. 
46 Olivares-Caminal and others (n 44) 93. 
47 Cole (n 12) 52. 
48 Coffee and Klein (n 9) 1229; Assénagon (n 13) [4]. 
49 While this example uses an exit consent, the same co-ordination problems (if real) apply to consent payments 
and early consent deadlines, which are on these premises also capable of coercing bondholders into amendments 
that in their unconstrained choice they would have rejected: Coffee and Klein (n 9) 1231. Assessing the Legality of Coercive Restructuring Tactics in UK Exchange Offers 
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the same dilemma and therefore they too tender their bonds. The exchange thus succeeds and 
each  bondholder  receives  $450,  even  though  it  would  have  been  preferable  for  each 
individual bondholder not to tender and retain $500. 
As to  whether exit consents  succeed in  coercing bondholders  in  practice, there is 
anecdotal  and  empirical  evidence  to  argue  either  side.50 After reviewing a sample of 25 
transactions, Bab found that tender offers with coercive devices attache d to them were far 
more likely to fail than non -coercive ones and thus concluded that exit consents were not 
coercive.51 However, Peterson’s study of a larger sample of 118 tender offers led him to the 
conclusion that ‘coercive elements probably do have some [positive] effect on the success of 
an  offer’.52 The  same  study  also  showed  that  in  27  successful  exchange  offers  (where 
coercive tactics were not used), bondholders who held out (and did not exchange) benefited 
from an increase of 27% in the price of their unexchanged bonds over pre-offer prices. This 
‘strongly supports’ the prediction that incentives to hold out will cause problems for non-
coercive US  exchange  offers and suggests that coercive tactics  do have a legitimate and 
useful role to play in US exchange offers.53 
Other authors have attacked the notion that bondholders cannot co-ordinate, a central 
premise of the coercive force imposed by the prisoner’s dilemma: 
The  assumptions  underlying  this  story  of  creditor  vulnerability  have  come  into 
question.  Institutions  have replaced individuals  as  the leading bondholders.  In the 
corporate  distress  context,  they  have  been  shown  to  be  capable  of  surmounting 
collective action problems and saying ‘no’ to an unsatisfactory offer from a distressed 
debtor.54 
Studies  have shown that bondholders are able in certain instances to overcome the co -
ordination problems and resist tender offers. For instance, in one study in the early 1990s, 
bondholders established formal co-ordination committees in 12 out of 58 tender offers .55 
                                                 
50 For authors suggesting anecdotally that exit consents are coercive, see: Nick P Saggese and others, ‘US and 
UK Tender Offers, Exchange Offers, and other Out-of-Court Restructurings’ in Chris Mallon and Shai Waisman 
(eds), The Law and Practice of Restructuring in the UK and US (OUP 2011) 82; Jill E Fisch and Caroline M 
Gentile, ‘Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2004) 53 Emory L J 
1043, 1092. For those suggesting they are not, see Bab (n 7) 879. 
51 Bab (n 7) 880. 
52 Peterson (n 22) 527. 
53 Peterson (n 22) 529. 
54 William W Bratton and G Mitu Gulati, ‘Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors’ (2004) 57 
Vand L Rev 1, 39. 
55 Marcel Kahan and Bruce Tuckman, ‘Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes?’ (1993) 66 J 
Bus 499, 512. The true number might have been higher, to the extent that the press releases did not mention 
every bondholder committee. Furthermore, in 42% of the 44 cases in  which bondholders  were required to UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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While a relatively small minority, it goes towards establishing that the prisoner’s dilemma 
model  of  bondholder  co-ordination  does  not  always  apply.  Furthermore,  it  is  common 
practice in the US for bondholders to ‘preemptively contact significant other bondholders to 
organize an ad hoc bondholder committee in anticipation of a debt restructuring’.56 The fact 
that  institutional  investors  hold  86%  of  the  US  corporate  bond  market  provides  further 
grounds  for  rejecting  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  theory.57 It  should  be  noted  that  the  same 
characteristics define the UK corporate bond market, where ‘trading in value terms is almost 
exclusively institutional/professional’ and large lot sizes, out of the reach of most individual 
investors, are commonly used to bring issuances within the exemptions of the Prospectus 
Directive.58 
Thus, while these restructuring tactics can have coercive effect, there are many 
circumstances where it is reasonable to believe that bondholders could overcome the co -
ordination difficulties and refuse the offer, if it is unfavourable to them. As Peterson points 
out, successful coercive offers are often good offers too. 59 Since much of the coercive effect 
of these tactics is premised on the alleged prisoner’s dilemma imposed on bondholders, and 
because of the inherent difficulties  of negotiations  in  the distressed debt  market,  the US 
courts’ non-interventionist approach to exit consents and consent solicitations is arguably 
appropriate in the US context. 
 
C.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABUSE PRINCIPLE 
English law has long provided that the vote attached to a share is a proprietary right that a 
shareholder may exercise in its ‘own selfish interests’.60 However, voting rights permit a 
shareholder to ‘control not only his own property but also that of others’.61 Accordingly, the 
courts  have  thought  fit  to  impose  the  limitation  of  the  abuse  principle  on  this  power, 
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notwithstanding  its  proprietary  nature.62 The most widely-cited formulation of the abuse 
principle appears in the Allen case, from Lindley MR: 
The  power  thus  conferred  on  companies  to  alter  the  regulations  (…)  [must]  be 
exercised subject to those general principles of law and equity which are applicable to 
all powers conferred on majorities and enabling them to bind minorities. It must be 
exercised, not only in the manner required by law, but also bona fide for the benefit of 
the company as a whole, and it must not be exceeded. These conditions are always 
implied, and are seldom, if ever, expressed.63 
The reasoning for limiting a shareholder’s right to vote is equally applicable to collective 
action clauses, a key organising principle in modern English corporate credit agreements. In 
the early 20th century, English courts accordingly saw fit to apply the abuse principle to 
decisions that lenders had taken in terms of such provisions.64 The abuse principle thus acts 
as a constraint on the decision of majorities to bind minorities, both in the context of 
shareholder and lending decisions.65 While it is true that the meaning of ‘bona fide in the best 
interest of the company’ has ‘beguiled and confused the Courts’, a number of propositions 
can be discerned from the shareholder cases, starting with the point that the burden of proof is 
on the party who challenges the amendment.66 The other propositions, as far as they  are 
relevant, are set out below. 
1.  The requirement of honesty and bona fides 
A pivotal question that the abuse principle asks is whether the members honestly believed 
that  the  exercise  of  the  power  was  for  the  benefit  of  the  company  as  a  whole. 67 This 
requirement  of  honesty  or  good  faith  ‘is  simply  a  reflection  of  the  traditional  equitable 
constraints on the ability of a majority to bind a minority … It protects the minority by 
ensuring that alterations motivated by malice, fraud and personal benefit cannot stand’.68 The 
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case of Brown v British Abrasive Wheel Co Ltd can be seen as an example of amendment that 
was made in bad faith.69 In Sidebottom v Kershaw, Leese & Co Ltd, Sterndale MR reviewed 
the decision in Brown’s case and explained the ruling forbidding the amendment on the basis 
that what was done ‘was not bona fide; it was not done for the benefit of the company, but for 
the benefit of [the majority]’.70 
The  fact  that  an  amendment  only  has  a  practical  effect  on  certain  identifiable 
shareholders does not necessarily mean that the amendment was made in bad faith. In Allen’s 
case, the plaintiffs charged the company with bad faith for amending its articles in a way that 
specifically targeted a particular deceased shareholder, whose estate owed the company a 
substantial amount of money.71 The amendment provided that the company would have a lien 
on the shares of all members who owed debts to the company. Although the court said the 
amendment ‘excite[d] suspicion as to the bona fides of the company’, it was not in bad 
faith.72 The only reason the deceased shareholder was affected was that he ‘was the only 
holder of paid-up shares who at the time was in arrear of calls’.73 
2.  Drawing an inference as to bona fides 
The fact that the majority passed the resolution honestly and in good faith is not, however, the 
end of the enquiry. Bowing completely to the subjective views of shareholders leaves the 
problem of the ‘amiable lunatic’.74 Furthermore, it is difficult enough to assess the state of 
mind of one person, but in this area, one is required to assess the ‘state of mind’ of a body of 
persons.75 In the  Shuttleworth  case,  the  Court  of  Appeal  sought  to  curb  this  problem  by 
approving a subjective approach, tested against objective circumstances. The test is whether 
the alteration of the articles was in the opinion of the shareholders for the benefit of the 
company. By what criterion is the court to ascertain the opinion of the shareholders upon this 
question? The alteration may be so oppressive as to cast suspicion on the honesty of the 
persons responsible for it, or so extravagant that no reasonable men could really consider it 
for the benefit of the company: ‘[T]he alteration of a company’s articles shall not stand if it is 
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such that no reasonable men could consider it for the benefit of the company…’76 The Court 
of Appeal sensibly rejected the purely objective test espoused in previous cases because ‘to 
adopt  that  view  would  be  to  make  the  Court  the  manager  of  the  affairs  of  innumerable 
companies instead of the shareholders themselves’.77 
3.  Conflicts of interest and ‘the company as a whole’ 
While the Shuttleworth case may appear to provide a reasonable basis for assessing whether a 
decision was made ‘bona fide for the benefit of the company’, it is of little utility when the 
decision adjusts the rights of the shareholders between each other.78 In exercising their votes, 
which  are  proprietary  rights,  shareholders  do  not  characteristically  exemplify  ‘inhuman 
altruism’; they will simply be considering what is best for themselves.79 Accordingly, it is 
somewhat artificial to base the test on whether a decision was bona fide for the benefit of the 
company, when it is in fact unlikely that those voting on it considered that question at all. 
An approach that is more sensitive to this consideration can be found in the High 
Court  of  Australia’s  decision  of  Peters’  American  Delicacy  Co  Ltd  v  Heath,  where  the 
directors of the company sought to amend an article to effect a profit capitalisation on what 
they considered to be a more equitable basis.80 The amendment reduced the potential profit 
capitalisation for certain shareholders, who then challenged it on the basis that the proposed 
change was not for the benefit of the company or the body of shareholders, but for the 
majority. The court found that the amendment was not invalid. Latham CJ stated ‘[I]n cases 
where the question which arises is simply a question as to the relative rights of different 
classes of shareholders the problem cannot be solved by regarding merely the benefit of the 
corporation’.81 In a similar vein, Dixon J stated that ‘[T]o say that the shareholders forming 
the majority must consider the advantage of the company as a whole in relation to such a 
question  seems  inappropriate,  if  not  meaningless,  and  at  all  events  starts  an  impossible 
inquiry’. 82 Thus  even  if  a  member  is  prejudiced  by  an  amendment  to  the  articles,  the 
amendment will not be invalid unless the member is able to show bad faith, fraud, oppression 
or that the amendment is ‘so extravagant that no reasonable person could believe that it was 
for the benefit of the company’.83 
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D.  THE APPLICATION OF THE ABUSE PRINCIPLE TO COERCIVE 
RESTRUCTURING TECHNIQUES 
Like the articles of a company, a modern credit agreement will usually institute a collective 
action  mechanism  in  terms  of  which  the  majority  lenders  are  able  to  make  democratic 
decisions and amendments to the agreement by voting. Until the Redwood case, however, the 
courts had not had an opportunity to consider the interaction of the abuse principle and these 
collective action clauses for a period of seventy years.84 
1.  The Redwood case 
In  the  Redwood  case,  the  claimants  challenged  a  variation  to  the  terms  of  a  €4  billion 
syndicated loan facility agreement, arguing that the majority had ‘abused their position as a 
majority and breached their duty to act bona fide in the interests of the lenders as a whole’ in 
acceding  to  the  terms  of  a  waiver  letter.85 So far as is relevant, the facility agreement 
comprised Facility A (a revolving credit facility) and Facility B (a term loan facility). Facility 
A was wholly undrawn while Facility B was almost completely (97.5%) drawn. 86 At the 
inception of the facility agreement, each lender held a commitment of Facility B that was 
3.66 times greater than its commitment under Facility A. 87 Importantly, many of the original 
lenders had traded their Facility A commitments on the secondary market, with the result that 
certain  new  lenders  (including  the  claimants)  held  only  (or  predominantly)  Facility  A 
commitments.88 
The facility agreement provided that in the event  of default, the borrower would not 
be entitled to draw down on any of the facilities. 89 In due course, the borrower anticipated a 
default  and  sought  to  obtain  the  relevant  waiver  from  the  lenders  under  the  facility 
agreement. Without this waiver, the borrower would have been unable to draw down on the 
facility agreement to fund its working capital.90 As part of an overall restructuring plan and as 
a condition of any waiver granted to the borrower, the lenders required an overall reduction 
of their commitments under the facility agreement. 91 The lenders initially assumed that this 
reduction would come from Facility A, the undrawn facility, but the borrower insisted (in 
negotiations that were ‘not easy’) on a reduction and prepayment of Facility B, using Facility 
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A,  because  this  would  improve  its  repayment  profile. 92 Until the claimants raised their 
objections, this proposal was not considered to be problematic, because it had been assumed 
that  all  lenders  held  their  Facility  A  commitments  in  proportion  to  their  F acility  B 
commitments.93 A prepayment using a Facility A drawdown under those circumstances 
would only have had a ‘cash positive or, at worst, a neutral effect’.94 However, for those who 
held predominantly Facility A commitments, the prepayment proposal ‘required them to take 
over from the B lenders a real and measurable exposure at a time when [the borrower’s] 
future solvency was in question’.95 
Nonetheless,  the  majority  lenders,  acting  in  terms  of  a  provision  entitling  lenders 
holding two-thirds in value to amend the facility agreement, waived certain covenants and 
relaxed the draw-stop. This allowed the borrower to drawdown on Facility A to repay Facility 
B. The claimants argued that the waiver letter was a violation of the abuse principle and that 
the Facility B lenders were enriching themselves at the expense of the minority, Facility A, 
lenders.96 Rimer J upheld the terms of the waiver letter. Although the fact that a small 
proportion of the Facility A lenders were adversely affected might, in the words of  Lindley 
MR,  ‘excite  suspicion’  as  to  the  bona  fides  of  the  majority,  the  facts  indicated  that  the 
majority  did  not  dictate  the  amendment  to  the  borrower.97 The borrower had negotiated 
forcefully for the reduction to come from the B facility because that imp roved its repayment 
profile in the optimal way. The majority were not even aware that certain lenders could be 
prejudiced until a relatively advanced point in negotiations and, as Rimer J indicated, they 
had no duty to educate themselves as to the percenta ge holdings of the various lenders. 98 It 
was thus not the B lenders’ intention that a minority of A lenders become net payers.99 In any 
event, only 14 of 29 B lenders benefited from the amendment.100 
Rimer J noted that it was inherent in a facility agreement s uch as this one that 
conflicts of interest could arise between the various classes of lenders and that ‘it would or 
could  in  practice often  be impossible for the majority to  exercise their [majority voting] 
powers in a manner which, viewed objectively, could be said to be for the benefit of each 
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hypothetical member of each class’.101 The claimants’ position was that if such impossibility 
were to arise, then the majority voting power would be paralysed. Rimer J could not accept 
this proposition as it would work against the purpose of the majority voting provision, which 
was  to  bind  dissentient  parties  on  difficult  decisions:  ‘[T]he  point  is  that  the  facility 
agreement is one under which all three lending classes are part of the long term lending 
package, and no class is entitled to say that it has had enough and wants to call a halt to its 
commitments’.102 Furthermore, the amendment placed the borrower in a stronger financial 
position, which was  to the benefit  of all lenders.  For these reasons,  the amendment  was 
upheld. 
Most commentators have remarked favourably on the judgment.103 The judgment is to 
be welcomed because it applies the abuse principle consistently with authority in a way that 
is  sensitive  to  the  commercial  importance  of  majority  lending  provisions. 104 Rimer  J, 
accepting that there was no bad faith on the part of the majority lenders, was appropriately 
deferential to the commercial benefits of the transaction extolled by the issuer. In particular, 
the fact that the resolution adversely affected a particul ar minority did not entail that the 
resolution was in bad faith, which is consistent with earlier decisions. 105 Rimer J was also in 
principle prepared to draw inferences of subjective bad faith on the basis of objective 
circumstances, which is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s approach in Shuttleworth.106 
Lastly, his reliance on the  Peters’ American Delicacy case is also appropriate because, as 
Prentice  has  commented,  ‘[i]n  any  situation  where  there  is  internal  disharmony  within  a 
company, it is fatuous to talk in terms of ‘the interests of the company’ when in actual fact 
the company is Balkanised into different factions’.107 
One deficiency in the judgment is that Rimer J considered that the abuse principle to be 
an implied term of the facility agreement, either on the basis of ‘obvious inference’ or ‘to 
give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties’.108 In the Assénagon case, Briggs J 
expressed  doubt  as  to  whether  this  approach  was  correct,  preferring  to  regard  the  abuse 
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principle as a term implied by law.109 Briggs J’s approach is arguably preferable, being more 
consistent with authority, in particular Lindley MR’s statement in the  Allen case that the 
abuse principle derives from ‘general principles of law and equity … applicable to all powers 
conferred on majorities’ and that it is ‘always implied’.110 
2.  The Azevedo case 
The  Azevedo  case  concerned  the  validity  of  consent  payments  made  exclusively  to 
bondholders  who  voted  in  favour  of  consent  solicitations  made  pursuant  to  the  issuer’s 
restructuring plan, a novel point under English law.111 Towards the end of 2008, the issuer 
and its group experienced difficulties with the issuer’s debt burden in the wake of that year’s 
financial  crisis.  Its  financial  advisers  developed  a  restructuring  plan  to  mitigate  these 
problems.112 The restructuring plan required various modifications to the terms of certain 
notes, some of which could only be obtained through a ‘special quorum’ resolution, which, in 
addition to the consent of 75% in value of those voting on it, also required a quorum of 75% 
in value.113 
The  proposed  modifications  involved,  among  other  aspects,  amendments  to  the 
economic  terms  of  the  notes,  including  postponement  of  interest  and  principal. 114  In 
conjunction with these consent solicitations, the documentation openly provided for a consent 
payment to be made exclusively to all noteholders voting in favour of the extraordinary 
resolution. 115 The  first  three  of such  resolutions were  passed with  close  to  unanimous 
majorities, with the claimants voting in favour.116 The fourth and final resolution was the one 
the claimants (who had voted in favour of the preceding three resolutions) voted against and 
subjected to challenge. The resolution provided that each noteholder who provided valid 
voting instructions in favour of the resolution, which cancelled an interest payment, and who 
did not revoke them would receive a consent payment of $25.94 for every $1,000 of the face 
value of the notes that the noteholder held.117 This amount was half the amount of the interest 
payment due and owing.118 
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The claimants argued that these consent payments violated the pari passu principle, in 
that  they  treated  consenting  and  non-consenting  noteholders  differently;  secondly,  they 
argued  that  the  consent  payments  constituted  a  bribe  and  therefore  rendered  the  consent 
solicitations and resultant resolutions illegal and invalid.119 The court rejected the claimants’ 
arguments and upheld the validity of the consent payments.120 While the claimants did not 
seek to argue that the consent payments violated the ab use principle, their bribery argument 
cited important cases in its history, namely the  Goodfellow case and the British America 
Nickel Corporation Ltd case.121 These cases support the application of the abuse principle to 
decisions taken pursuant to majority lending provisions. However, neither case advanced the 
claimants’ argument. 
In Goodfellow, the scheme documents openly provided certain benefits to a party 
whose consent was vital for approval of the scheme. The scheme was held to be valid. In the 
British America Nickel Corporation Ltd case, certain benefits were also offered to a party 
whose consent was vital for approval of the scheme. These offers were, however, made in 
secret.  The  scheme  was  therefore  invalid,  confirming  the  converse  of  the  principle  in 
Goodfellow. Hamblen J concluded that together the cases showed that ‘payments offered in 
exchange for votes do not constitute bribery where the relevant scheme has openly provided 
for the separate treatment of persons with a different interest’.122 Since the resolutions and 
accompanying documentation had repeatedly made transparent disclosures surrounding the 
consent payments, the consent payments did not amount to bribery. Furthermore, two other 
features of the consent payments were inconsistent with bribery: first, the consent payments 
each noteholder received were made on an equal basis and second, each noteholder was 
freely entitled to vote on the resolution as it saw fit.123 
Hamblen  J  noted  that  it  had  not  been  argued  that  the  consent  payments  were 
oppressive to those who did not receive them. 124 In this context, it should be borne in mind 
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that, as noted in Part B, offering a consent payment to those who vote in favour alters the 
incentives of the participants, punishing those who do not support the resolution. Those who 
do not support the resolution but who believe it will be passed anyway have an incentive to 
vote in favour and at least collect the consent payment. To the extent that bondholders are 
exposed to a prisoner’s dilemma through co-ordination problems, a consent payment could 
conceivably be attacked on grounds of oppression and the abuse principle.125 
While Hamblen J did not need to decide the point, he made some remarks that 
indicated that he did not believe that the notes were unduly oppressive. First, he noted that the 
claimants had accepted previous consent payments and waived their right to test their 
validity. That only shows that previously they accepted them, not that they were fair. His 
second  point  was  that  an  ‘overwhelming’  majority  voted  in  favour  of  the  resolutions. 
However, respect for the democratic principle does not go towards establishing the fairness of 
a decision towards a dissenting minority. Lastly, he noted that the consent payments formed 
part of a comprehensive reorganisation that was formally confirmed as a matter of Brazilian 
law.126 
This point also does not establish that the consent payments were not oppressive as a 
matter of English law. The Court of Appeal also failed to offer a suitable explanation. It 
emphasised that the special quorum requirement of 75% provided the issuer with a ‘special 
reason’ to offer the consent payment to vote on the resolution.127 It is true that establishing 
such a quorum of dispersed bondholders might prove difficult; however, that is an argument 
for paying the consent payment for assisting to establish the quorum, not for voting in favour 
of the resolution. Neither the High Court nor the Court of Appeal addressed the fundamental 
point that a consent payment can alter the incentives of bondholders in a potentially coercive 
way. 
Thus, while no one was accused of dishonesty or malice, it could be argued that the 
coercive element inherent in a consent payment renders the payment an abuse against the 
minority  who  did  not  receive  it.  However,  it  is  suggested  that  this  argument  would  be 
incorrect and that the decision in Azevedo is consistent with the abuse principle. The coercive 
effect of a consent payment is premised on the inability of the bondholders to co-ordinate 
with  each  other  to  overcome  the  prisoner’s  dilemma.  However,  empirical  research 
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demonstrates  that  bondholders  are  at  least  on  occasion  able  to  organise  themselves  into 
committees  to  present  a  united  front  to  issuers. 128 The  concentration  of  sophisticated 
institutional investors in the UK bond market and the inference that as ‘repeat players’, they 
know whom to contact, adds weight to this argument.129 These considerations entail that a 
court should exercise caution before concluding that a coercive prisoner’s dilemma arose in a 
particular restructuring. 
If bondholder co-ordination were practically impossible – because, for example, the 
investor was an individual with a small holding – then the possibility of coercion remains. 
That said, even though a coercive element is present, the offer might still be one that is 
beneficial to bondholders. In the absence of malice, the court is required to draw an inference 
as to bad faith from the facts before it is able to intervene on the basis of the abuse principle. 
It  is  only  able  to  do  this  if  ‘no  reasonable  men  could  consider  it  for  the  benefit  of  the 
company’ or ‘it is so manifestly disadvantageous, discriminatory or oppressive towards them 
that the only conclusion that can be drawn is that it must have been motivated by dishonest 
considerations’.130 This is a high threshold to cross and arguably it was not satisfied in the 
Azevedo case. 
As  Briggs  J  noted  in  the  Assénagon  case,  the  Azevedo  resolutions  were  ‘plainly 
capable  of  being  beneficial  to  noteholders,  since  they  were  designed  to  facilitate  a 
reconstruction of the issuer, beneficial to all its stakeholders’.131 Arguably, a consent payment 
was a rational option given some of the difficulties of work-outs in the distressed debt market 
alluded  to  in  Part  B,  including  the  problem  of  the  hold-out  creditor,  the  opacity  of  the 
distressed  debt  market  and  the  psychological  barriers  of  decision-makers  to  loss-taking 
settlements. It seems fair to conclude that it would on these facts be very difficult for the 
claimants to discharge their onus of showing bad faith on the part of the issuer. If however a 
consent payment were substantially larger than is customary, it might ‘excite suspicion’ as to 
its bona fides. The traditional approach of lawyers to drafting might deter such an aggressive 
course of action, but if such a case were brought to the courts, it could well infringe the abuse 
principle.132 It would however be very difficult ‘to say where the line should be drawn’.133 
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3.  The Assénagon case 
The Assénagon case was the first decision to consider the validity of exit consents under 
English law.134 On the basis of the abuse principle, Briggs J found that an exit consent in an 
exchange that stripped any notes that were not exchanged of virtually all of their value was 
invalid. The dispute arose out of a restructuring of the issuer necessitated by its significant 
exposure to commercial property lending at the time of the 2008 financial crisis. As the issuer 
was deemed to be of systemic national importance, various steps were taken by the Irish 
Government to shore up the issuer’s finances. These included an initial two-year guarantee of 
various of the issuer’s liabilities, including the notes that were the subject of the exchange, 
nationalisation of the issuer and various equity injections.135 The issuer sustained enormous 
losses over  the  following  months:  by  December  2009,  losses  stood  at  €12.7bn.  By  30 
September  2010,  the  Irish  Government  had  provided  €22.88bn  in  capital  while  a  newly 
formed government agency had acquired €6.5bn worth of distressed loans from the issuer.136 
While the Irish Government was seeking to salvage the issuer, the claimant acquired its notes 
at  a  discount  to  face  value  of  between  0.418  and  0.420  per  nominal  euro,  the  discount 
reflecting  the  fact  that  the  notes  were  subordinated  and  the  Irish  Government  was  not 
expected  to  extend  its  guarantee  of  the  notes  at  the  possible  expense  of  retail  deposit 
holders.137 
This expectation proved to be accurate when the Irish Government announced its 
restructuring plan on 30 September 2010, which anticipated that ‘subordinated debt holders 
[would] make a significant contribution’ towards meeting the liabilities of the issuer.138 The 
most relevant aspect of the restructuring plan to the notes was an exchange offer, in terms of 
which  bondholders  were  invited  to  tender  their  notes  for  exchange  for  new  notes  at  an 
exchange ratio of 0.2, meaning that for every €1 of face value of old notes, the exchanging 
bondholder  would  only  receive  €0.2  of  new  notes.  The  new  notes  were  however 
unsubordinated and guaranteed by the Irish Government.139 In order to tender their bonds, it 
would also be necessary for the bondholder to appoint a proxy to vote in its stead at a meeting 
in favour of an extraordinary resolution. The relevant resolution provided for the insertion of 
a right of the issuer to redeem the notes upon payment of €0.01 per €1,000, a payment ratio 
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of 0.00001 (which contrasted with a payment ratio of 0.2 under the exchange).140 The effect 
of the exchange therefore was that if a bondholder chose not to exchange its bonds, it ran the 
risk that, if the resolution were nonetheless passed, its notes could be redeemed for practically 
nothing. Indeed, that is the risk that the claimant chose to take. Shortly after the extraordinary 
resolution was passed, the issuer then purported to exercise its newl y acquired right to 
redeem the claimant’s notes, which had a face value of €17m, for only €170. 
The claimant challenged the resolution purportedly passed at the meeting on three 
grounds. The first challenge, which failed, was that the resolution was ultra vires the power to 
amend the note. As a matter of contractual interpretation, the court found that the issuer had 
the necessary power.141 The second challenge, which succeeded, was on the basis that at the 
time of the meeting, the issuer was beneficially entitled to the notes on which the noteholders 
were purporting to vote. This meant that in terms of a standard ‘sterilisation’ clause included 
in the notes, the issuer was disenfranchised from voting on notes beneficially held by it.142 
However, because of the  possibility of appeal on the second point as well as the abuse 
principle’s wider importance to the restructuring community in this context, Briggs J also 
gave judgment on the third challenge.143 The substance of the complaint was that the exit 
consent infringed the abuse principle because it permitted the expropriation of the notes of a 
defined minority in circumstances where the majority could exchange their old notes for new 
notes  of  ‘substantial  value’.144 It  was  contended  that  this  was  of  no  possible  benefit  to 
noteholders and thus ‘oppressive and unfairly prejudicial’. Briggs J agreed, finding the exit 
consent to be invalid on the facts of the case. 
The issuer sought to argue that the exit consent had to be seen in the wider context of 
the role of the exchange offer, which offered ‘real value’ for the notes, in the rescue of a 
deeply distressed bank. In such light, it was contended, the exchange offer and exit consent, 
which the noteholders could ‘freely’ accept, were clearly for the benefit of the noteholders as 
a  class. 145 Furthermore,  there  was  ample  authority  for  the  proposition  that  where  an 
inducement to support a scheme is properly disclosed to all members of the class, a challenge 
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on the basis of the abuse principle will usually fail.146 The issuer thus pointed towards the 
wider context of its efforts to effect a comprehensive restructuring. 
In contrast, the claimant focused on the prejudicial effect of the resolution on the 
minority. Briggs J noted that he was essentially required to choose between two di fferent 
analytical approaches. Rejecting the issuer’s approach, Briggs J distinguished the authority 
cited by the issuer on the basis that those cases  represented instances  where  ‘it  was  not 
irrational  to  conclude  that  the  proposal,  ignoring  the  benefit  of  the  inducement,  was 
nonetheless itself capable of being regarded as beneficial to the class’.147 By implication, in 
this instance, it would be irrational to conclude that the expropriatory exit consent could be 
for the benefit of the class. The exit consent’s ‘only function is the intimidation of a potential 
minority, based upon the fear of any individual member of the class that, by rejecting the 
exchange and voting against the resolution, he … will be left out in the cold’.148 Further, 
those voting in favour of the exit consent had no common interest with the non-exchanging 
bondholders. Briggs J concluded that the coercive nature of the exit consent was ‘entirely at 
variance with the purposes for which majorities in a class are given power to bind minorities’ 
and  that  ‘oppression  of  a  minority  is  of  the  essence  of  exit  consents  of  this  kind’. 149 
Furthermore,  the  noteholders’  ‘relative  inability’  to  co-ordinate  between  each  other 
‘aggravated’ the purely coercive nature of the exit consent.150 
On the facts, Assénagon represents a correct application of the abuse principle. Briggs 
J’s use of the language of ‘irrationality’ is similar to the language used in the Shuttleworth 
case, where the court found that a resolution would be impugned if ‘no reasonable men could 
consider  it  for  the  benefit  of  the  company’.151 It  seems  fair  to  conclude  that  there  is no 
rational justification for such an over-reaching and confiscatory exit consent. One was left 
with  the  conclusion  that  its  only  purpose  was  to  coerce  the  minority  into  accepting  the 
restructuring.  By  contrast,  the  court  noted  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  criticise  a 
‘drag-along’ exit consent that permitted those who did not vote in favour of the resolution to 
nonetheless exchange their bonds for a ‘potentially beneficial’ substitute if the resolution 
were successfully passed.152 
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Using this structure would permit an issuer to achieve its goal of retiring an entire 
tranche of debt by only obtaining the levels of consent required in the indenture for the 
prescribed supermajority, which will usually be two-thirds or 75%.153 If such an exchange 
offer is completed, there is no possibility, as in the US, of non -exchanging bondholders 
consuming the savings generated by the exchange offer with their unaffected economic 
rights: they would be compelled to exchange their bonds at the same price as the majority. A 
drag-along scheme is therefore a viable alternative to achieve the same restructuring as that 
which the exit consent sought to bring about. The fact that another means that was no t 
coercive could arguably have been used provides good reason to suggest that a rational 
bondholder would not consider the expropriatory exit consent to be in the interests of the 
class.154 
One relatively unsatisfactory element of the Assénagon judgment is Briggs J’s attempt 
to distinguish Assénagon from Azevedo by characterising the consent solicitation payment as 
a positive financial inducement (permissible) and the exit consent as a ‘negative’ inducement 
(impermissible).155 As argued above, consent payments, early consent fees, and exit consents 
all have the potential to exercise coercion on bondholders. The difference is a question of 
degree, not whether it is a negative inducement or not. If one were to imagine an issuer 
launching a cash tender offer with a consent payment that was half the price offered for the 
tendered securities, it is hard to imagine the court permitting this purely on the basis of its not 
being a negative inducement. The court would, in those circumstances, need to consider 
whether  a rational bondholder voting in the class could consider the consent payment 
beneficial to the class. 
The decision has also introduced doubt as to whether exit consents that merely strip 
covenants  are  valid,  because  some  of  Briggs  J’s  statements,  taken  in  isolation,  imply  a 
complete ban on them. For instance, he notes that the claimant’s ‘original submissions’ could, 
if correct, ‘prima facie apply to any form of exit consent which imposed less favourable 
consequences upon those who declined to participate’.156 He also used very harsh language 
when describing the exit consent, particularly in the conclusion of his judgment where he 
stated that ‘oppression of the minority is of the essence of exit consents’.157 
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Arguably, this condemnation specifically applied to the expropriatory species of exit 
consent under consideration, which was designed ‘to destroy rather than to enhance the value 
of the notes and [which] was, on its own, of no conceivable benefit to noteholders’.158 It is 
true that this statement encompasses any exit consent that, while not completely confiscatory, 
has only the intention of dampening bondholder enthusiasm for retaining their old bonds in 
the face of a proffered exchange by damaging their value. It could thus include covenant-
stripping exit consents. However, some exit consents have different and arguably legitimate 
purposes. For instance, an exit consent could remove a negative pledge covenant to allow the 
taking of further security for new money, a restriction on disposals covenant in order to allow 
for an asset sale, or amend a leverage ratio covenant in order to allow the issuer to take on 
further debt, without putting the issuer into default. If the removal of covenants is, in the 
honest  view  of  the  issuer,  necessary  for  an  aspect  of  a  restructuring,  which  would  be 
beneficial for the non-exchanging bondholders, and there is a rational basis for such view, 
then arguably such exit consents would be acceptable, notwithstanding the adverse effect 
upon the non-exchanging bondholders. 
The  courts  have  a  long  tradition  of  respecting  business  judgment,  provided  the 
decision is not in bad faith.159 Therefore, if the court is satisfied that the proposal passes the 
minimum threshold of rationality set out in the  Shuttleworth and Redwood cases, then it 
should permit the exit consent.160 In contradistinction, it is unlikely that the courts would 
permit wholesale covenant-stripping, where such removal is not justifiable in light of the 
proposed restructuring. This reasoning also suggests that it would not be possible  to provide 
for non-exchanging bondholders to receive a less valuable exchange than the exchanging 
bondholders, since such a threat would be purely punitive. 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Exchange  offers  can  be  a  useful  mechanism  for  financially  restructuring  over-leveraged 
companies  in  an  efficient  and  flexible  manner.  However,  restructuring  negotiations  are 
notoriously  difficult  and  hold-out  creditors  pose  a  particular  threat  to  efficient  exchange 
offers by threatening to consume the savings generated by the exchange offer. This suggests 
that coercive tactics in exchange offers can have a legitimate role to play in an economy that 
prefers  efficient  restructurings  to  more  expensive  alternatives,  such  as  formal  insolvency 
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processes. As such, whether the abuse principle has ‘killed’ exit consents and other kinds of 
coercive  restructuring  tactics  in  England  is  an  important  question  for  issuers  and  the 
restructuring community.161 The answer to this question is negative. It is highly unlikely that 
the unusual exit consent in the Assénagon judgment will ever be resurrected. However, there 
are persuasive grounds to believe that the judgment does not as a matter of logic entail that all 
other ‘covenant-stripping’ exit consents or, indeed, other potentially coercive restructuring 
tactics, are unlawful. 
Shuttleworth, Redwood and Assénagon show that to successfully invoke the abuse 
principle, disgruntled bondholders must discharge their onus in showing that it is irrational to 
conclude that the proposals were beneficial for the class.162 However, issuers may well be 
able to show some benefit for the class, notwithstanding the use of a tactic that prejudices 
non-exchanging bondholders (in the case of an exit consent combined with a covenant strip, 
or a consent solicitation payment), or late exch anging bondholders (in the case of an early 
consent payment). Issuers and their majority bondholders would be able to point to the 
benefit of a broader restructuring as evidence of the rationality of the proposed scheme for 
non-exchanging bondholders, provided the prejudice to them is not too severe, as in the 
Assénagon case. Litigious minority bondholders would have to go further and cross the high 
threshold, before courts that respect the business judgment of honest persons, of showing that 
the coercive tactic manifestly exceeds the commercial necessities of the restructuring to such 
an extent that it is irrational for bondholders to conclude that it is in the interests of the 
class.163 
This relatively deferential approach is consistent with the English cour ts’  attitude 
towards the business decisions of honest persons. While there is some empirical evidence that 
coercive tactics have in the past proved to be a useful tool in corporate restructurings, fears of 
coercing bondholders into a prisoner’s dilemma-type scenario do appear to be exaggerated, 
given the possibility of bondholder co-ordination. A measure of deference, and scepticism, in 
assessing the true coercive effect of these techniques is therefore appropriate. Moreover, even 
if a tactic introduces a measure of coercion, it is appropriate that the coercion should be 
considered in light of the difficulties of negotiating with hold-out creditors and achieving 
consent in consensual restructurings. Finally, it should also be weighed against the efficient 
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economic benefits of a successful exchange offer to the non-exchanging bondholders. These 
factors indicate that some degree of coercion is acceptable and even appropriate. 
Seen in this light, the ruling that the early consent payment in Azevedo was lawful is 
not  inconsistent  with  the ruling that the  exit consent  in  Assénagon  was  unlawful.  In the 
circumstances, the former represents an acceptable degree of coercion because the offer as a 
whole  was,  in  the  eyes  of  a  rational  person,  still  capable  of  being  beneficial  to  the 
non-exchanging bondholders. Assénagon’s exit consent, on the other hand, is an extreme 
example of the use of coercive tactics, offering no benefit to non-exchanging bondholders. It 
was therefore understandably intolerable to the court. 
It has been argued that some exit consents could withstand the scrutiny of the abuse 
principle (eg a covenant strip that facilitates an asset disposal). That said, it is likely that 
Assénagon will curb issuer enthusiasm for exit consents, at least until a higher court has an 
opportunity to consider the matter. Until that time, the market is likely to see an increased use 
of the ‘drag-along’ schemes that received Briggs J’s blessing and which have already been 
used in the recent Co-operative Bank restructuring.164 
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